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Abstract: GPS units are multiplying around the world and are being used in both
vehicles and cellular phones. With the increasing pervasiveness of GPS, law
enforcement now has the capability of learning the specific location of a suspect
without the suspect's knowledge or consent. This note will examine when law
enforcement officials may use GPS to track suspects without a warrant under both
federal law and state law. This note will also examine when law enforcement
officials may obtain documents from third-party service providers about a suspect's
location information.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1993, the U.S. Air Force launched the 24th
NAVSTAR satellite into orbit, completing the network of satellites
that make up the Global Positioning System ("GPS"). 1 GPS works by
measuring the distance from a receiver to four individual satellites to
determine a receiver's longitude, latitude, and altitude.2  To
"triangulate" a position in this manner, a GPS receiver calculates the
distance to each satellite by measuring the time necessary for a radio
signal to travel to that satellite.3  Since the development of GPS,
receiver units have become relatively widespread and inexpensive.
GPS units are now prevalent in automobiles and cellular phones.
General Motors offers its GPS service, OnStar, in over fifty models of
its 2007 line.4  Verizon Wireless provides GPS-based services that
allow subscribers to get directions and search for local points of
interest, such as restaurants and ATMs.5 Due to the prevalence of GPS
receivers in today's society, the government's power to obtain GPS-
based location information has raised privacy concerns.
Cellular phones provide an even more interesting aspect regarding
the government's power to obtain personal location information.
December 31, 2005, saw the completion of Phase II of Enhanced 911
or "E911.,6 This program, promulgated by the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), requires cellular phone
service providers to "achieve 95 percent penetration of location-
capable handsets among its subscribers." 7  This requirement was
' See National Parks Service, The History of GPS, http://www.nps.gov/gis/gps/history.html
(last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
2 See SCOT PACE ET AL., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: ASSESSING NATIONAL POLICIES
237-38 (1995), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographreports/MR614/MR614.appb.pdf.
3 For an explanation on the process of how GPS works, see Trimble, GPS Tutorial,
http://www.trimble.com/gps/howgps.shtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
4 See OnStar by GM, OnStar & GPS Equipped Vehicles, Auto Navigation System,
http://www.onstar.com/usenglish/jsp/equip-vehicles/07_vehicles.jsp (last visited Dec. 30,
2007).
5 See Verizon Wireless, Point Yourself in the Right Direction with VZ Navigator,
http://www.verizonwireless.comib2c/splash/tumbyturn.jsp (last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
647 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2006).
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established in response to the growing number of 911 calls originating
from cellular phones and the failure of emergency services to access
the location of the caller in an emergency situation.8 Pursuant to this
rule, service providers have included GPS chips in the cellular phones
that they sell. However, obtaining location information through
cellular phones is nothing new. Government agents have long been
able to access information about the location of a phone's "cell site."
The government can access this information either in real time or for
as far back as eighteen months.
9
The current debate on the use of GPS focuses on the level of
privacy that consumers of this technology can expect with the
location-related information that is prevalent in this technology. This
article will attempt to answer two questions: (1) When may the
government use GPS to directly track your location? and (2) When
may the government access records of a suspect's location from third-
party enterprises that provide GPS services?
There currently is no legislation, either federal or state, restricting
the government's use of GPS to track the location of suspects. Absent
legislation, only the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States limits the federal government's use of this technology
when it would constitute an unreasonable search or seizure. This
paper will consider (1) the limits placed on the federal government's
use of this technology under the Constitution of the United States; (2)
the limits placed on state governments' use of this technology under
respective state constitutions; (3) the alternative method for tracking
cellular phones, other than GPS, and relevant statutes concerning the
protection of location information from this method; and (4)
government access to records of third-party service providers
regarding location information.
10
8 See Geoffrey D. Smith, Private Eyes Are Watching You: With the Implementation of the E-
911 Mandate, Who Will Watch Every Move You Make?, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 705, 706 (2006)
("In 2001, a thirty-two year old woman drove off of the Florida Turnpike, into a canal. As her
car was sinking she dialed 911. She talked to the dispatcher for over three minutes but did not
know her exact location. Rescuers were unable to find her before she died.").
9 Retention of Telephone Toll Records Rule. 47 C.F.R. § 42.6 (2006) ("Each carrier that offers
or bills toll telephone service shall retain for a period of 18 months such records as are
necessary to provide the following billing information about telephone calls: the name,
address, and telephone number of the caller, telephone number called, date, time and length of
the call.").
0 A related issue to privacy of information in the use of vehicles is the use of event data
recorders, or automobile "black boxes." However, this article will focus specifically on
privacy in location information. Event data recorders do not record location information, but
instead only record performance information of the vehicle such as speed, braking power, and
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II. THE LAW RESTRICTING GOVERNMENT USE OF GPS
A. FEDERAL LAW
There are two ways in which the government may use GPS to
identify the location of a suspect: the government may directly attach a
GPS unit to a suspect's vehicle or the government may obtain GPS
location information (or other technology-based location information)
from a current service provider. There currently is no legislation
restricting the government's use of GPS.
Absent any legislation, the only protection provided to citizens is
the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches
and seizures."11 A search occurs when a government agent infringes
on an expectation of privacy that society considers reasonable.' 2  A
seizure occurs when the government interferes with an individual's
possesory interest in property. 13  Such interference occurs when the
government intentionally interferes with the freedom of movement. 
14
The Supreme Court of the United States has determined the limits
that the Constitution places on government use of tracking technology
in two cases: United States v. Knotts15 and United States v. Karo.
Another Supreme Court case that could have future consequences on
government use of tracking technology is Kyllo v. United States.
17
Although the issue of the government's use of GPS has not reached the
seat belt use. See W.R. Haight, Automobile Event Data Recorder (EDR) Technology-
Evolution, Data, and Reliability (2001), available at http://www.accidentreconstruction.com/
researchiedr/ docs/EDRPaperRHaight.pdf. Therefore, automobile event data recorders fall
outside of the scope of this article.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12 John S. Ganz, Comment, It's Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not Need
Warrants to Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices, 95 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1325, 1332
(2005) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
13 Id. at 1333 (citing United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 945 (6th Cir. 1980)).
14 Id. (citing Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990)).
15 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
16 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
17 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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Supreme Court, many district courts have considered the issue, the
most recent of which is United States v. Moran. 1
8
In United States v. Knotts, Minnesota law enforcement agents
installed a beeper in a five-gallon container of chloroform that was
suspected of being used to manufacture illicit drugs. 19 After the
purchase of the chloroform, the agents followed the car carrying the
chloroform, maintaining contact through both visual surveillance and
monitoring the beeper signals. 20 During the tracking of the suspect's
vehicle, the suspect began making evasive maneuvers and officers lost
both visual contact and the beeper signal.21 Officers eventually
regained the signal from the beeper and determined that the signal was
stationary and emanating from a cabin.22 Officers used the location of
the chloroform derived through the use of the beeper and additional
visual surveillance of the cabin to secure a search warrant.23 When
executing the warrant, officers discovered a fully operable
methamphetamine lab.24 The container of chloroform containing the
beeper was discovered under a barrel outside of the cabin.25
The Supreme Court held that the warrantless monitoring of the
beeper did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment right. 6 The
Court used a two-step analysis originally established by Justice Harlan
in Katz v. United States.27 The first step was to determine whether the
individual, by his conduct, had exhibited an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy. The second step was to determine whether the
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. 28  The Court reasoned that "a
18 United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
'9 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
20 id.
2 1 id.
22 id.
23 Id. at 279.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 285.
27 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
28 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280-81.
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person traveling in an automobile has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movement from one place to another." 29 The fact that
agents used a beeper to track the vehicle was immaterial to the Court.
The Court reasoned that "a police car following [the suspect] at a
distance throughout his journey could have observed him leaving the
public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respondent, with
the drum of chloroform still in the car."30 The Court hinted that the
defendant's Fourth Amendment right would have been violated had
the use of the beeper ,reveal[ed] information as to the movement of
the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would have not been
visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin."
31
Unlike Knotts, the Supreme Court found that government agents
violated the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Karo.3 2 In Karo,
DEA agents suspected that a 50-gallon shipment of ether was going to
be used to extract cocaine from clothing that had been imported into
the United States.33 The agents obtained a court order authorizing the
installation and monitoring of a beeper in one of the cans of ether.34
The agents used both physical and electronic surveillance of the
shipment while it was being transported along public highways but
stopped visual surveillance when the shipment arrived at a house for
fear of detection.3 5 When the vehicles used to deliver the shipment left
the residence, agents used the receiver to determine that the beeper
was inside the house.3 6 The agents used the information derived from
the use of the beeper to obtain a search warrant for the residence.
37
29 Id. at 281. The Court explained this diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile by
stating: "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects.
A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where
both its occupants and its contents are in plain view." Id. (citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974)).
30 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
31 id.
32 Karo, 468 U.S. 705.
33 Id. at 708.
34 id.
35 Id. at 709.
36 Id. at 709-10.
37 Id. at 710.
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The Supreme Court held that monitoring the beeper in the private
residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violated the
Fourth Amendment right of the defendant who had a justifiable
interest in the privacy of the residence.18 The Court held that "private
residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy
free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that
expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable. 39
A recent Fourth Amendment case with some bearing on the issue
of the use of GPS is Kyllo v. United States.40 In Kyllo, a government
agent suspected Kyllo was growing marijuana inside his home.41 The
agent used a thermal-imaging device to detect infrared radiation from
high-intensity halide lamps inside the residence that were being used
to grow marijuana. 42 The agent used this information to obtain a
search warrant of the residence and found more than one-hundred
marijuana plants.43 The Supreme Court determined that the use of the
thermal imager constituted a "search" and violated the defendant's
Fourth Amendment right.44 The Court declared that when "the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."4 5 This case could
have implications in future cases if a court were to determine that GPS
has become part of the "general public use" to the extent that
government use of it does not constitute an unreasonable search
without a warrant.
The most recent federal case involving the challenge of the
warrantless use of GPS to track a suspect's vehicle is United States v.
38 Id. at 714.
39 id.
40 Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27.
41 Id. at 29.
42 Id. at 29-30.
431Id. at 30.
44 See id. at 40.
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Moran.4 6 At a trial for narcotics charges, the defendant moved to
suppress evidence obtained from a GPS device that was attached to his
vehicle without a warrant on the grounds that it violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. 47 The court concluded that the use of the GPS
device was permissible because "Moran had no expectation of privacy
in the whereabouts of his vehicle on a public highway.' 4s The court
noted that because "law enforcement personnel could have conducted
a visual surveillance of the vehicle as it traveled on the public
highways," there was no search or seizure in the use of the GPSdevice. 9
B. STATE LAW
A handful of state courts have also considered the need for law
enforcement agents to obtain a warrant prior to using GPS to track a
suspect. Although law enforcement may use GPS to track a suspect's
vehicle without a warrant under the United States Constitution, "the
United States Supreme Court has noted that states are free to interpret
their own constitutional provisions as providing greater protections
than analogous federal provisions. 5 °
There is currently a split in the states that have considered whether
their respective constitutions permit government agents to track
suspects with GPS without a warrant. For example, under the
California and Nevada Constitutions, law enforcement agents do not
need to obtain a warrant to track suspects with GPS. The Louisiana,
Oregon, and Washington Constitutions, on the other hand, do require
law enforcement agents to obtain warrants. New York courts have
considered the issue but the matter remains unresolved.
46 Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425.
47 Id. at 467.
48 id.
49 Id.
50 Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 525 (Nev. 2002) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1041 (1983)).
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1. STATES WHERE No WARRANT IS REQUIRED
A. CALIFORNIA
The California Sixth District Court of Appeal considered the
warrantless use of GPS to track a defendant's vehicle in People v.
Zichwic.51 In Zichwic, the defendant had been released from prison
and placed on parole subject to the condition that his "residence and
any property under [his] control [could] be searched without a warrant
by . . . any law enforcement officer."52  Police suspected the
defendant's involvement in burglaries and obtained authorization from
the defendant's parole officer to conduct electronic surveillance of the
defendant. 53 Officers placed an electronic monitoring device on the
undercarriage of the defendant's truck while it was parked in the
defendant's driveway at a multi-unit single story complex.
54
The Zichwic Court determined that the placement of the
monitoring device did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment
right under the California Constitution.55 The Court applied a two-step
analysis: first, it looked to the subjective expectation of privacy of the
defendant; second, it analyzed the objective expectation of privacy.
As to the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy, the Court
reasoned that the imposition of the warrantless search provision as a
condition of parole diminished the defendant's reasonable expectation
of privacy.56 The Court also concluded that there was no objective
expectation of privacy:
There can be no objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in what is regularly exposed to public view. While
the undercarriage of a vehicle is not as readily seen as the
hood, doors, and other parts of its exterior, the undercarriage
is part of the exterior that is ordinarily exposed to public
51 People v. Zichwic, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
2 Id. at 737.
53 Id.
14 Id. at 737-38.
" Id. at 743.
16 Id. at 739.
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view. It does not amount to a search to examine the
undercarriage, to touch it, or to attach a tracking device, so
long as a police officer does so from a place where the
officer has a right to be.57
The Zichwic Court considered whether monitoring the signals from
the tracking device constituted a search 8  The Court, relying on
Knotts, concluded that the monitoring of the device did not constitute a
search since the monitoring "simly revealed the movements of
defendant's truck on city streets. ' 5  Therefore, under the California
Constitution, California law enforcement may attach and monitor a
GPS device to a vehicle without a warrant.
B. NEVADA
The Supreme Court of Nevada considered the warrantless use of a
GPS tracker in Osburn v. State.60 In Osburn, as part of a serial rape
investigation, police attached an electronic monitoring device to the
bumper of the defendant's vehicle in order to track his movements as
he traveled on public streets.6' Through visual surveillance and use of
the electronic monitoring device, the police observed the defendant
committing "voyeuristic activities." 62 Police then obtained a search
warrant, searched the defendant's vehicle, and found burglary tools
and child pornography.
63
In determining whether attaching the electronic device constituted
a search or seizure under the Nevada Constitution, the Court applied a
two-step analysis: "in order for an unreasonable search or seizure to
exist, the complaining individual must have a reasonable expectation
of privacy, which requires both a subjective and an objective
57 Id. at 742.
58 Id. at 743.
59 Id.
60 Osburn, 44 P.3d 523.
61 Id. at 524 (the defendant's vehicle was parked on the street at the time the monitoring device
was attached).
62 Id.
63 id.
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expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized."6 4 The
Court decided that the defendant exhibited no subjective expectation
of privacy to the exterior of his vehicle because "he did not take any
steps to shield or hide the area from inspection by others." 65 The court
concluded that there was also no objective expectation of privacy since
"the exterior of a vehicle, including its bumper, is open to public view
and susceptible to casual inspection by the passerby." 66 Therefore,
under the Nevada Constitution, Nevada law enforcement agents may
attach and monitor a GPS device to a vehicle without a warrant.
2. STATES WHERE A WARRANT IS REQUIRED
A. LOUISIANA
The First Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana considered the
government's use of electronic surveillance "beepers" on the
defendants' vehicles in State v. Peters.67 In Peters, law enforcement
suspected the defendants of burglaries and obtained a warrant to install
and monitor a tracking device on the defendants' vehicles.68  The
Court stated that the Louisiana Constitution provides "greater
protection for individual rights than that provided by the Fourth
Amendment." 69 The court noted that any threats to "privacy interests
are reasonably protected by obtaining a warrant." 70  Therefore,
Louisiana law enforcement officials are required to obtain a warrant
prior to placing a tracking device on a suspect's vehicle.
6Id. at 526.
65 id.
66 Id. ("Moreover, manufacturers, dealers and owners often take advantage of this public
visibility by displaying model names, company logos, decals, and bumper stickers on the
exteriors of automobiles. In light of these facts, we can see no objective expectation of privacy
in the exterior of an automobile.").
67 State v. Peters, 546 So. 2d 829 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
68 Id. at 833.
69 Id. at 834.
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B. OREGON
The Supreme Court of Oregon considered the warrantless use of a
GPS tracker in State v. Campbell.7' In Campbell, Oregon law
enforcement suspected that the defendant was committing residential
burglaries.72 Police attempted to follow the defendant's automobile
but were unable to do so without detection because of the rural nature
of the area.73  Officers then attached a radio transmitter to the
underside of the defendant's vehicle while it was parked in a public
parking lot.74 Seven days later, officers used the trackin 5 device to
discover that the defendant's vehicle was forty miles away. Officers
used an airplane and visually observed the defendant getting out of his
vehicle and acting in a manner that suggested he was burglarizing a
nearby residence.
The Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that attaching the
transmitter to the defendant's vehicle constituted a "search" under the
Oregon Constitution. 77 The Court noted that the privacy protected by
the Oregon Constitution "is not the privacy that one reasonably
expects but the privacy to which one has a right., 78  The Court
reasoned that the critical question "is whether under our system of
government . . . we should impose on our citizens the risks of the
electronic listener or observer without at least the protection of a
warrant requirement."7 9 The Court rejected adopting the standard of
"public thoroughfares" stated by the United States Supreme Court in
Knotts:
71 State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988).
"2Id. at 1041.
73 id.
74 1d. at 1042.
75 id.
76 id.
77Id. at 1041.
78Id. at 1044.
79 Id. (citations omitted).
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The argument is factually unsound on the record before us,
because the police, notwithstanding diligent efforts, found it
impossible to follow defendant's automobile through visual
surveillance.... Using the transmitter, police were able to
locate defendant's automobile some 40 miles from where
they expected to find it, and to do so they did not need to
maintain constant surveillance of the transmitter or to follow
a trail, as one would track a person by looking for footprints,
broken branches, etc.8 °
The Court, instead, stated that a privacy interest under the Oregon
Constitution was "an interest in freedom from particular forms of
scrutiny." 81 The proper test under the Oregon Constitution is deciding
"whether the practice, if engaged in wholly at the discretion of the
government, will significantly impair 'the people's freedom from
scrutiny, for the protection of that freedom is the principle that
underlies the prohibition on 'unreasonable searches.'
8 2
The Court concluded "any device that enables the police quickly to
locate a person or object anywhere within a 40-mile radius, day or
night, over a period of several days, is a significant limitation on
freedom from scrutiny." 83 The fact that there would be no means for
individuals to ascertain when they were being scrutinized and when
they were not, constituted a staggering limitation upon personal
freedom.84 Therefore, under the Oregon Constitution, Oregon law
enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to attaching a GPS unit to a
suspect's vehicle. 85
801 Id. at 1045.
811d. at 1047.
82 Id. at 1048.
83 Id. ("The limitation is made more substantial by the fact that the radio transmitter is much
more difficult to detect than would-be observers who must rely upon the sense of sight.
Without an ongoing, meticulous examination of one's possessions, one can never be sure that
one's location is not being monitored by means of a radio transmitter.").
84 Id. at 1049.
85 The Oregon Supreme Court revisited the issue in State v. Meredith, 96 P.3d 342 (Or. 2004).
The United States Forest Service ("USFS") suspected the defendant, an employee of USFS, of
arson. Id. at 343. USFS attached a GPS unit to the undercarriage of the vehicle (owned by
USFS) used by the defendant and used it to catch defendant in the act of arson. Id. The Court
concluded that the "defendant did not have a protected privacy interest in keeping her location
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C. WASHINGTON
The Washington Supreme Court considered whether a warrant was
needed for the use of a GPS tracker in State v. Jackson.86 In Jackson,
police sustected a father in the disappearance and murder of his
daughter.8 7 Police obtained a warrant to attach a GPS unit to the
defendant's vehicle in the belief that the defendant would lead them to
his daughter's body.8 The GPS data showed that the defendant went
to a remote location where his vehicle remained for about thirty
minutes.89  Investigators went to this location and discovered his
daughter's body in a shallow grave.
90
On appeal from a guilty verdict for first degree murder, the
Supreme Court of Washington considered the use of the GPS tracker
in light of the Washington Constitution. The Court held that the
Washington Constitution is more protective than the United States
Constitution and "focuses on 'those privacy interests which citizens of
this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from
governmental trespass. '91 The Court stated that no search occurs
where a law enforcement officer is able to detect something at a lawful
vantage point.92 "However, a substantial and unreasonable departure
from a lawful vantage point, or a particularly intrusive method of
viewing, may constitute a search."9  Furthermore, "the nature and
extent of information obtained by the police ... is relevant in deciding
whether an expectation of privacy an individual has is one which a
citizen of this state should be entitled to hold.,
94
and work-related activities concealed from the type of observation by her employer that the
transmitter revealed." Id. at 346.
86 State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
87 Id. at 220.
" Id. at 221.
89 Id.
9 Id.
9' Id. at 222.
92 id.
93 Id. (citations omitted).
94 id.
[Vol. 3:3
The Court concluded that the Washington Constitution required
law enforcement to obtain a warrant before attaching a GPS unit to a
suspect's vehicle: "[i]f police are not required to obtain a warrant
under [the Washington Constitution] before attaching a GPS device to
a citizen's vehicle, then there is no limitation on the State's use of
these devices on any person's vehicle, whether criminal activity is
suspected or not."95 Therefore, under the Washington Constitution,
Washington law enforcement officials must obtain a warrant prior to
attaching a GPS unit to a suspect's vehicle.
96
3. STATES WHERE THE MATTER IS STILL IN DISPUTE
A. NEW YORK
New York provides a unique situation. Two New York courts of
equal authority have considered the issue, but reached opposite
conclusions. The New York Nassau County Court first considered the
issue in People v. Lacey.97 In Lacey, police investigating a robbery
were given a description of the getaway vehicle, including the license
plate number.98 Investigators obtained the address of the vehicle's
registrant and placed a GPS unit on the vehicle while it was parked on
the street.99 Investigators used the GPS signal and visual surveillance
to catch the defendant in the process of burglarizing homes.1
00
The Nassau County Court considered the activity "a search and
seizure" under the New York Constitution:
[I]ndividuals must be given the constitutional protections
necessary to their continued unfettered freedom from a 'big
brother' society.... [A] person must feel secure that his or
her every movement will not be tracked except upon a
9' Id. at 224.
96 In Jackson, the Court affirmed the conviction because law enforcement had obtained
warrants prior to attaching the GPS device, and because the warrants were supported by
probable cause. Id. at 227.
97 People v. Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676 (Nassau County Ct. 2004).
98 Id. at * 1.
99 Id.
00 Id. at *2.
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warrant based on probable cause establishing that such
person has been or is about to commit a crime. . [I]t is
clear that the mere act of parking a vehicle on a public street
does not give law enforcement the unfettered right to tamper
with the vehicle by surreptitiously attaching a tracking
device without either the owner's consent or without a
warrant issued by a Court. 1'
Therefore, the Court concluded that the attachment of a GPS unit to a
vehicle without a warrant violated the New York Constitution.
10 2
The New York County Court for Westchester County also
considered the issue in People v. Gant.10 3 In Gant, the defendant was
indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. 10 4  The
defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that law
enforcement violated the New York Constitution when they attached a
GPS unit to his RV without a warrant.105 The Court applied a two-part
test measuring first, the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy,
and second the objective expectation of privacy from society's
perspective. The Court noted that the defendant did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy since he did not own the vehicle.'0 7
The Court then relied on Knotts, stating that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the movements of the vehicle.'0 8 The Court
concluded that the defendant "has not established that he has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle traveling upon a public
roadways [sic] such that law enforcement was required to obtain a
'0' Id. at *7-8.
102 However, because the defendant did not own the vehicle, he did not have standing to assert
that his rights were violated under the New York Constitution. Therefore, his motion to
suppress the evidence was denied. Id. at *9-10.
103 People v. Gant, 802 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Westchester County Ct. 2005).
'04 Id. at 840.
1o5 Id. at 845.
106 Id. at 845-46 (stating that "Where there is no expectation of privacy, there is no search and
seizure.") (citations omitted).
117 Id. at 845.
'0' Id. at 846.
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search warrant prior its 9 installation of a GPS device to track the
vehicles' whereabouts."' 9
Even though it is unclear from the judicial decisions whether New
York law enforcement agents must obtain a warrant before tracking a
suspect, the holding in Gant is better reasoned and more persuasive
than the holding in Lacey. Article 1, Section 12 of the New York
Constitution guarantees "the right of the people to be secure against
unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph
communications." The Lacey Court seems to be relying on this
provision when interpreting the reasonableness of the use of GPS by
the government, which is technically unrelated to the interception of a
telephone or telegraph signal.
The Lacey Court also considered several cases that have examined
the issue of GPS use by the government when construing0the meaning
of the privacy clause in the New York Constitution.' The Gant
Court, however, relied strictly on the precedent of Knotts and
construed the privacy clause of the New York Constitution to match
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, if
the issue were ever to come before a higher New York State court, that
court should find that the New York Constitution does not require
New York law enforcement agents to obtain a warrant prior to
attaching a GPS device to a suspect's vehicle.
III. ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF TRACKING CELLULAR PHONES
The most precise method of tracking individuals is through GPS.
GPS can be used to track individuals in their vehicles and through
cellular phones. However, GPS is not the only method for tracking
cellular phones. Cellular phones can also be tracked when calls are
made with the phone through the service provider's cell towers, or cell
sites. A cellular phone can be located through signal triangulation
when a cell phone "sees" two or more towers." Triangulation is easy
where cell sites overlap, particularly in high-density population urban
109 Id. at 847. "In addition, this Court finds no greater privacy interest is afforded to a vehicle
traveling upon a public roadway under the New York State Constitution, than that which is
afforded under the United States Constitution." Id. The court further held that its decision
was consistent with Lacey since the defendants in both cases lacked standing. Id. at 848.
1o See Lacey, 787 N.Y.S.2d at *4-7.
u Recent Development, Who Knows Where You 've Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the
Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators. 18 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308 (2004).
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areas. 112 In rural areas, the location of a cellular phone often may not
be able to be determined as accurately, specifically where cell sites do
not overlap and it is not possible to triangulate the signal. However, it
is possible to determine the general location of the cellular phone
based on the maximum range of the cell site.
113
Government access to location information available through the
use of cellular phones is governed by the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA"). 114 CALEA requires a
telecommunications carrier to enable the government, pursuant to a
court order, to access "call-identifying information ... before, during,
or immediately after the transmission of a wire or electronic
communication."' 1 5  "Call-identifying information" is defined as
"dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction,
destination, or termination of each communication generated or
received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or
service of a telecommunications carrier. ' 116  However, when law
enforcement agents only obtain court orders for pen registers and trap
and trace devices, 1 7 "such call-identifying information shall not
include any information that may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber." 
1 1 8
The FCC, in interpreting and enforcing this statute, however, has
found that "a subject's cell site location at the beginning and end of a
call is call-identifying information under CALEA."' Therefore,
government agents may obtain only the general cell site location
112 See Wikipedia, Cell Site, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cell_site (last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
113 Id. (The maximum range of a cell site where the terrain is flat is between 50 to 70
kilometers. The maximum range of a cell site where the terrain is hilly can vary from 5 to 40
kilometers.).
114 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001 etseq. (2006).
"'5 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(A) (2006).
116 § 1001(2).
117 These are methods of obtaining call information such as routing, numbers called by the
subscriber, or numbers of incoming calls, but not the actual content of the call. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3127 (2006).
. 1147 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006).
1 " FCC, In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 14 F.C.C.R. 16794, 1 44
(1999) ("Third Report and Order"). This interpretation was upheld in U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n
v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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information of a subscriber. However, in order to obtain information
on cell site location, the government must show probable cause that
the location information sought is itself evidence of a crime, not that it
is relevant to an investigation.
120
It is unclear how the use of GPS in cell phones affects this process.
The primary issue is whether court orders for pen registers also permit
government officials to obtain GPS location information. The reason
for concern is that a different standard could apply to government
officials seeking location information. An application for a pen
register must certify "that the information likely to be obtained is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted.' 121 If
CALEA were construed narrowly to apply only to phone calls, then
the use of the GPS service falls out of the scope of the statute and a
subscriber's location may not be obtained by law enforcement through
the use of GPS. However, if the statute were applied broadly so that a
subscriber's use of GPS qualifies as "call-identifying information," the
government fares no better. The location information provided by
GPS would fall into the exception that "such call-identifying
information shall not include any information that may disclose the
physical location of the subscriber" and would still not be available to
the government. 1
22
On the face of the statute, a subscriber's physical location is
protected from being released to the government upon the filing of an
application for a pen register. One federal court has authorized
government officials to obtain cell-site location information while
denying detailed triangulation or GPS location information, pursuant
to a pen register application upon a showing that the information was
likely relevant to an ongoing investigation.'12 These statutes, however,
apply only to the real-time tracking of a suspect through his cell
phone. Would a service provider's records of a subscriber's use of a
GPS service through his cell phone be equally off limits to law
enforcement agents?
12 See In re Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp.
2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
121 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2006).
122 § 1002(a)(2)(B).
123 See In re Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678
(W.D. La. 2006).
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IV. GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO RECORDS REGARDING LOCATION
The government has the power not only to track the location of a
suspect's vehicle or cellular phone in real time, with the appropriate
legal process, but also can access any records of a suspect's location
kept by a third-party service provider. The seminal case regarding the
government's access to records is United States v. Miller.'12r In Miller,
the defendant was convicted of possessing an unregistered whiskey
still with the intent to defraud the government of the whiskey tax.'1
5
During the investigation, agents from the Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms Bureau presented subpoenas for all of the bank records of the
defendant to the presidents of the banks where the defendant held
accounts. 126  The banks did not notify the defendant about the
subpoenas but instead gave the documents to the government
agents. 127 The bank records were then presented to a rand jury and
the grand jury returned an indictment of the defendant.'
The Supreme Court of the United States held that there was "no
intrusion into any area in which respondent had a protected Fourth
Amendment interest."' 129 The Court held that the defendant had no
ownership or possessory interest in the documents because they were
the business records of the bank.130  Because all of the documents
contained information voluntarily conveyed to the banks, the Court
held that the defendant took "the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information [would] be conveyed by that person to
the Government."' 131 The Court stated the rule broadly:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
124 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
121 Id. at 436.
121 Id. at 437.
12 Id. at 438.
128 id.
"9 Id. at 440.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 443.
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Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not
be betrayed. 
132
Therefore, the government may obtain any collected information from
a third party without violating the Fourth Amendment.
Congress restricted the holding in Miller by requiring government
officials seeking financial records to serve a copy of the subpoena on
the customer and by requiring customers who wish for their records to
remain private to file a motion to quash within ten days of service or
risk waiving protection of their bank records. 133  Many privacy
advocates are also critical of the holding in Miller. One critic urges
that "the individual's intent in disclosing the record at issue to the
business is critical in determining whether such disclosure should be
considered 'voluntary."" 134 Another critic argues that a broad reading
of Miller should be rejected because a holding that "any reliance on a
third party to retain a communication eliminates an expectation of
privacy in the contents of the communication is inconsistent with
Katz."
135
The Miller ruling merits clarification. Under Miller, third-party
documents may be disclosed pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.1
A subpoena is issued by an attorney, who acts as a representative of
the court. 1 3 7 Third-party documents are subject to a subpoena if they
are likely to lead to relevant evidence. 38 A subpoena is therefore
different from a warrant. A warrant is an order that is issued by the
judge that authorizes a law enforcement officer to search for and seize
132id.
133 12 U.S.C. § 3405 (2006).
134 Deidre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1557,
1581 (2004).
135 Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1375, 1405 (2004).
136 A subpoena duces tecum is a writ ordering a witness to appear and produce documents.
Black's Law Dictionary 674 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
137 FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a).
3
' See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
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any property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a crime. 139
Therefore, as a result of this distinction, a warrant from the judge is
required to allow the government to directly track a suspect with a
GPS unit while only a subpoena is required to allow the government to
obtain documents containing relevant location information from GPS
service providers.
Applying Miller to business records of GPS vehicle location, the
government has no limitation in accessing information of a person's
location that is kept by the service provider. A court could find that a
person voluntarily conveyed his location to a service provider by
subscribing to a GPS based service when the subscriber has the
knowledge that the provider will have access to his location
information. The amount of information that the government can
collect in this indirect manner is limited only by the amount and detail
of the records kept by the service providers. According to OnStar's
Privacy Policy:
OnStar only knows where your car is when a user or
subscriber initiates a request for service, there is an Air Bag
Deployment, an Advanced Automatic Crash Notification
occurs, or OnStar is required to locate the car to comply with
legal requirements, including valid court orders showing
probable cause in criminal investigations. 140
Therefore, law enforcement officials would be able to access any
records of a customer's vehicle location only when the customer was
using the service, such as obtaining driving directions, or when the
GPS equipment automatically calls the service provider for software
updates.
The amount of location information available to law enforcement
through GPS service providers like OnStar may be severely limited.
While OnStar is available on over fifty models of GM's 2007 line,
14 1
OnStar is not able to track all of these vehicles. 4 2 Vehicles for which
139 NEW JERSEY LIBRARY ASS'N, GUIDELINES TO ASSIST LIBRARIES WITH REQUESTS FOR
CONFIDENTIAL LIBRARY RECORDS, (2002), http://www.njla.org/statements/confoflib.html.
140 OnStar, OnStar Privacy Statement, July 2007,
http://www.onstar.com/usenglish/jsp/privacypolicy.jsp.
141 See OnStar by GM, supra note 4.
142 Telephone Interview with Joanne Finnorn, General Counsel, OnStar (Dec. 21, 2006).
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the service is not purchased are deactivated and are unable to be
tracked by OnStar. r43 Also, when a subscriber of OnStar makes a
request for service, OnStar has location information of the vehicle only
for the time of the communication transmission. 144  Once the
communication transmission is terminated, OnStar no longer has any
GPS location information on the 'vehicle. 145  For instance, if a
subscriber contacts OnStar with a request for driving directions,
OnStar only has the location information of the vehicle during the time
that the directions are transmitted to the vehicle and does not know the
location of the vehicle as it follows those directions.
Furthermore, Miller would also seem to apply to the use of GPS-
based services in a subscriber's cell phone. Any records kept by a
service provider of a subscriber's location would seem to be available
to government agents on the grounds that the subscriber voluntarily
conveyed his location to the service provider and took the risk that the
information would be conveyed to the government.
V. CONCLUSION
There seems to be ample protection in place for consumers'
privacy concerns regarding government access to location information.
When a person uses a vehicle, its location information is open to
public scrutiny. The vehicle may be observed by anyone. The fact
that federal law enforcement may use GPS tracking devices without a
warrant does not infringe on the privacy of a person any more than if
federal agents were to visually tail the vehicle. State law enforcement
agents are limited by their respective state constitutions, and only
Louisiana, Oregon, and Washington have reached the conclusion that
law enforcement agents must obtain a warrant prior to attaching a GPS
unit to a suspect's vehicle.
The only restriction placed on law enforcement by the Fourth
Amendment is that agents must not pass the curtilage of a residence to
attach a GPS unit to a suspect's vehicle, such as if the vehicle were
parked in the suspect's garage. However, this limitation is irrelevant
as most people who drive vehicles eventually park them in public
locations. Law enforcement agents only need to wait for the suspect to
park the vehicle in a public location to attach the GPS unit to the
143 Id.
144 id.
145 Id.
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vehicle. The federal courts, and half of the state courts to consider the
issue, have found no constitutional protection afforded to citizens from
the government use of GPS.
As for records of vehicle location kept by a service provider, the
subscriber is voluntarily conveying his location information to the
service provider and is taking the risk that those records may be
obtained by the government pursuant to a subpoena. This would likely
be the case, because subscribing to GPS location service is not a
necessity to the extent that a bank account is under Miller. If a
customer does not want to risk that records of his location at a few
specific instances will be subject to a subpoena from the government,
then the customer can simply choose not to purchase the service. This
history of location information is limited only by the detail of the
service provider's records and the length of time for which the records
are kept.
This level of protection also seems ample to protect a consumer's
location information that would be available through the use of a
cellular phone. When law enforcement officials obtain a warrant for a
pen register, they are limited to the location of the cell site. This only
gives a general location of the suspect and is not as intrusive as the use
of a GPS unit on a suspect's vehicle. If government agents were to
obtain a warrant to track a suspect through the GPS unit in his cellular
phone, agents would have access to the specific location of a suspect.
However, since people mainly use cellular phones when they are in
public, there would be no violation of a person's Fourth Amendment
rights. Because the person is out in public, there would not be a
reasonable expectation of privacy. The only situation where the
Fourth Amendment would be violated is if law enforcement agents
were to track a suspect's cellular phone through its GPS unit without a
warrant and the suspect was located in his house at the time of the
tracking. According to the Supreme Court's analysis in Kyllo, this
situation would result in an unreasonable search.
There are two reasons, however, why this situation would likely
never arise. The first is that the technology is limited. It is not
possible to get signals of GPS units indoors. "Because the phone picks
up GPS signals from satellites like other satellite systems (DirectTV
for instance), it won't be able to get positions while being indoors,
underground or in tunnels."'146 Therefore, even if law enforcement
attempted to track the GPS unit in a cellular phone, there would be no
146 AcuTracking, Frequently Asked Questions, http://support.accutracking.com/
index.php?x=&mod-id=2&root-2 (last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
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location information available as long as the cellular phone is in a
building, including a private residence.
The second reason why this situation would not arise is that service
providers are not likely to voluntarily hand over a subscriber's location
information to law enforcement agents without a warrant. "The theory
holds that the marketplace will protect privacy because the fair
treatment of personal information is valuable to consumers; in other
words, industry will seek to protect personal information to gain
consumer confidence and maximize profits."' 147 For instance, Verizon
Wireless "always requires a warrant from law enforcement
officials."' 148 It would only take one high-profile case of bad publicity
to hurt a service provider's standing in the market. To prevent this,
service providers are likely to always require a warrant from law
enforcement officials before tracking a suspect's GPS unit in his
cellular phone.
It is apparent that citizens are provided ample protection from
government intrusion when the government decides to track a
suspect's location through the use of GPS. Citizens are protected in
private spaces by the Fourth Amendment, by physical limitations on
the technology, and by market pressures. Whether more stringent
protections from GPS tracking by the government should be
guaranteed to citizens while in public space is a determination to be
made by Congress.
147 Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 771, 774 (1999).
148 Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Nelson, Public Policy and Regulatory Affairs
Spokesman, Verizon (Nov. 16, 2006).
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